Wayfair, What\u27s Fair, and Undue Burden by Fatale, Michael T.
Chapman Law Review
Volume 22
Issue 1 Symposium: The Commerce Clause and the
Global Economy
Article 3
Winter 1-1-2019
Wayfair, What's Fair, and Undue Burden
Michael T. Fatale
Boston College Law School, chapmanlawreview@chapman.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Fowler School of Law at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Chapman Law Review by an authorized editor of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
laughtin@chapman.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael T. Fatale, Wayfair, What's Fair, and Undue Burden, 22 Chap. L. Rev. 19 (2019).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/chapman-law-review/vol22/iss1/3
  
 
 
CHAPMAN LAW REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
 
Citation: Michael T. Fatale, Wayfair, What’s Fair, and Undue Burden, 22 
CHAP. L. REV. 19 (2019).  
--For copyright information, please contact chapmanlawreview@chapman.edu. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPMAN UNIVERSITY | FOWLER SCHOOL OF LAW | ONE UNIVERSITY DRIVE | ORANGE, 
CALIFORNIA 92866 
WWW.CHAPMANLAWREVIEW.COM 
19
Wayfair, What’s Fair, and Undue Burden 
Michael T. Fatale
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc.1 evaluated the state tax jurisdiction or “nexus” rules that 
apply under the so-called “dormant” aspect of the Commerce 
Clause.2 Wayfair overruled, as “unsound and incorrect,” the 
physical presence nexus rule of National Bellas Hess, Inc. 
v. Department of Revenue of Illinois,3 and Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota,4 as applied to a state use tax collection duty.5 Wayfair
concluded that this standard was inconsistent with the Court’s 
longstanding construction of the dormant Commerce Clause.6
Wayfair was a 5-4 decision featuring two concurrences that 
leave somewhat uncertain what part of its analysis a majority of 
the Justices assented to.7 All nine Justices expressed antipathy 
to the physical presence rule. Also, there was apparently broad 
consensus that in the absence of the physical presence rule, state 
tax nexus is to be evaluated applying due process principles.8
Wayfair, like other recent state court cases decided by the Court, 
illustrates that the Court continues to be concerned with state 
tax discrimination and a related concept, the impermissible 
 Deputy General Counsel at the Massachusetts Department of Revenue and adjunct 
professor at Boston College Law School. He thanks the following persons for helpful 
comments submitted in connection with this Article: Richard Cram, Dave Davenport, Joe 
Garrett, Brett Goldberg, Brian Hamer, Helen Hecht, Phil Horwitz, Sheldon Laskin, Greg 
Matson, Dan Schweitzer, Shirley Sicilian and Don Twomey. This Article expresses the 
author’s views and not necessarily those of the Massachusetts Department of Revenue. 
1 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). 
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 
(2008) (“The Commerce Clause empowers Congress ‘[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States,’ and although its terms do not expressly restrain ‘the several States’ in any way, 
we have sensed a negative implication in the provision since the early days . . . [which] has 
come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause . . . . ” (internal citations omitted)). 
3 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
4 504 U.S. 298 (1992). 
5 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. The rule also applied to the use tax collection 
requirement as imposed by localities. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6. In this Article, 
reference to the states’ use tax collection duties is intended to also reference such duties 
as imposed by these localities. 
6 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093–94. See also infra notes 22–26, 87–89 and 
accompanying text.  
7 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2087. 
8 See id. at 2093; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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imposition of a double tax.9 But Wayfair suggests that neither 
discrimination nor double taxation will typically be implicated 
when a state asserts a use tax collection duty.10
The most confusing aspect of Wayfair is the majority’s 
ambivalent, vague suggestion that state tax jurisdiction can also be 
evaluated utilizing the dormant Commerce Clause principle of 
“undue burden.”11 Undue burden is an inquiry that derives from the 
1970 case, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,12 which pertained to a state 
statute that regulated commercial activity and not to the imposition 
of a state tax.13 The Pike balancing test has not been applied in the 
state tax context and is no longer favored by the Court even in the 
regulatory context. Quill originally introduced the undue burden 
notion into the state tax context, but did so in a way that did not 
require the application of that test.14 Moreover, Wayfair rejected the 
reasoning that Quill used to invoke Pike. Wayfair suggests that the 
Court itself would not actually apply the undue burden standard to 
the imposition of a state’s use tax collection duty—and that test has 
no logical application with respect to other state taxes. Further, 
because the undue burden test has no history with respect to state 
taxes, it is not clear how it would be applied to such taxes.  
Wayfair’s reference to the undue burden standard seems 
intended to encourage states to simplify their state and local 
use tax collection systems as they apply to out-of-state 
vendors—particularly small vendors. This is certainly a laudable 
purpose. But the reference risks creating needless litigation and 
confused lower court reasoning—a consequence that would 
hearken back to the after-effects of Quill. Ironically, Wayfair
creates this prospect even though it was critical of the litigation 
and confusion wrought by Quill.15 There was no need for Wayfair
to invoke the undue burden principle, as what the Court 
apparently sought to achieve could be better accomplished 
through a straightforward application of the Due Process Clause. 
9 See, e.g., Comptroller of Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015). See also
Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Mich. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n, 545 U.S. 429 (2005); S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999); Gen. 
Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997); Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of 
Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
10 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
11 Id. at 2098–99. 
12 397 U.S. 137 (1970).  
13 See id. at 138; see also David S. Day, The “Mature” Rehnquist Court and the 
Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine: The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV.
1, 1–2 (2007) (noting that the second aspect of the dormant Commerce Clause test applied 
to non-tax state regulations is “commonly referred to as the ‘undue burden’ standard”). 
14 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305, 314–15 (1992). 
15 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092, 2097–98. 
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This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part One revisits the 
holdings and history of Bellas Hess and Quill. Part Two discusses 
the history and text of the South Dakota statute at issue in Wayfair.
Part Three considers the legal theories evaluated by the Court in 
Wayfair—in particular the notions of discrimination, due process, 
and undue burden. Part Four offers some concluding remarks.  
II. BELLAS HESS AND QUILL
Wayfair overruled Quill and Bellas Hess,16 both of which 
pertained to a state’s attempt to impose a use tax collection duty 
on an out-of-state vendor making sales to in-state consumers.17
The use tax serves as a complement to the sales tax and acts to 
prevent a consumer from seeking to avoid sales tax by 
purchasing goods outside the state.18 The tax achieves this result 
since it applies to the in-state use or consumption by the 
purchaser of products from a vendor located outside the state 
when such purchases are not otherwise subject to tax.19 In 
general, the use tax is technically owed by the consumer.20 But 
states require vendors to collect the use tax because obtaining 
the tax from consumers is a difficult administrative chore and 
consumer self-compliance is notoriously low.21
In the years prior to Bellas Hess, the Court retreated from its 
pre-existing dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.22 That doctrine 
posited that the states could not impose direct burdens, including 
taxes, on interstate, as opposed to intrastate, commerce.23 The 
Court abandoned this “free market” approach in part because, as 
the twentieth century progressed, the distinction between interstate 
and intrastate commerce became difficult to define.24 The Court 
also became concerned about arbitrary and inconsistent judicial 
16 Id. at 2099. 
17 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992); Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. 
v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 754 (1967). This Article refers to the issue as addressed 
by these cases with respect to a state’s use tax collection duty, but the same issue can also 
arise in connection with a state’s sales tax collection duty. See, e.g., Quill, 504 U.S. at 317. 
The South Dakota law referenced in Wayfair technically imposed sales tax and not use 
tax because the incidence of the tax—with respect to “goods, wares or merchandise” sold 
at retail to in-state “consumers or users”—was imposed upon the vendor. See S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 10-45-2 (2016). See also infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
18 See, e.g., Nelson v. Sears Roebuck, 312 U.S. 359, 361, 363 (1941); Henneford 
v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 581 (1937).  
19 Sears Roebuck, 312 U.S. at 361–63. 
20 Id. at 363. 
21 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088. See also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 
1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2016). 
22 See Michael T. Fatale, The Evolution of Due Process and State Tax Jurisdiction,
55 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 565, 573–77 (2015). 
23 See id. at 573–75. 
24 See id. at 573–76. 
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applications of these concepts because such rulings had the 
potential to unjustly infringe upon state sovereignty.25 The Court 
was guided by its oft-stated conclusion that it was not the 
purpose of the Commerce Clause to prevent interstate business 
from paying its fair share of state tax.26
As a consequence of the Court’s doctrinal evolution, in the 
mid-part of the twentieth century, state tax jurisdiction was 
extended to companies whose only contact with a state was the 
activity of salespersons. Formerly, such contacts had been 
deemed “interstate” and therefore not sufficient to create taxing 
jurisdiction. But in a series of cases, the Court rejected this rule.27
Eventually, the Court extended the principle that permitted the 
imposition of state tax based upon the activity of salespersons 
to circumstances where the representatives were not company 
employees and were engaged in activities other than actually 
making sales.28
Bellas Hess involved a fact pattern that further challenged 
the Court’s doctrinal evolution. In Bellas Hess, the out-of-state 
business was a mail-order vendor that conducted significant 
business in the state without the use of any sales or other 
representatives.29 Although the Court had previously departed 
from the view that the “interstate” nature of a company’s in-state 
contacts could insulate that company from tax, Bellas Hess took a 
step backwards. The Court held that a state could not impose a 
use tax collection duty upon a seller whose only connection with 
customers in a state was through the use of common carriers and 
the United States mail.30 Bellas Hess justified its conclusion by 
stating that “it is difficult to conceive of commercial transactions 
more exclusively interstate in character than the mail-order 
transactions here involved.”31 The Court also supported its logic 
by focusing on the particular complexities that relate to the 
collection of use tax—including the fact that such obligations are 
imposed not only by states but also by numerous municipalities.32
25 See id. at 575. 
26 See id. at 575 & n.64. 
27 See, e.g., Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 208–09 (1960); Nw. States Portland 
Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 454 (1959). See also Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 
326 U.S. 310, 321 (1945).  
28 See, e.g., Tyler Pipe v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249–50 (1987). 
29 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 754, 754–55 (1967). 
30 Id. at 758. 
31 Id. at 759. 
32 Id. at 759–60.  
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The Court noted that, despite its holding, the domain was one 
where Congress possessed “the power of regulation and control.”33
Bellas Hess was a 6-3 decision.34 Writing for the dissenting 
Justices, Justice Fortas stated that “[t]here should be no doubt 
that this large-scale, systematic, continuous solicitation and 
exploitation of the Illinois consumer market is a sufficient ‘nexus’ 
to require Bellas Hess to collect from Illinois customers and to 
remit the use tax.”35 Citing the Court’s prior precedent with 
respect to sales representatives, the dissent argued in favor of “a 
sensible, practical conception of the Commerce Clause.”36 The 
dissent also argued that where a mail-order vendor’s exploitation of 
the state’s economic market is pervasive, the case for jurisdiction is 
just as strong as, or perhaps stronger than, where the out-of-state 
company is subject to tax through the use of in-state sales 
representatives.37 The dissent dismissed the majority’s focus on 
compliance burdens, noting that this analysis underestimated the 
capacity of technology to ease those difficulties.38
Quill involved similar facts to Bellas Hess.39 By the time of 
Quill, the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine had further evolved, 
and had specifically concluded, in the case of Complete Auto 
Transit v. Brady,40 that interstate commerce was not immune 
from state taxation.41 That conclusion eradicated the conceptual 
underpinnings of Bellas Hess.42 The Court’s progression of cases 
between Bellas Hess and Quill caused the state of North Dakota to 
posit in Quill that Bellas Hess had been effectively overruled.43
33 Id. at 760. Quill would later question whether this was in fact so, given that 
Bellas Hess was decided on both Commerce Clause and Due Process grounds. See Quill 
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). 
34 See Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 760 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 761–62 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas was joined by Justices Black 
and Douglas. See id. at 760. 
36 Id. at 764–66 (citing Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960)). 
37 Id. at 764–65. 
38 Id. at 766.  
39 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 301 (1992). 
40 430 U.S. 274 (1977).  
41 Id. at 278–79. In Goldberg v. Sweet, the Court noted:  
The wavering doctrinal lines of our pre-Complete Auto cases reflect the tension 
between two competing concepts: the view that interstate commerce enjoys a 
“free trade” immunity from state taxation; and the view that businesses 
engaged in interstate commerce may be required to pay their own way. 
Complete Auto sought to resolve this tension by specifically rejecting the view 
that the States cannot tax interstate commerce, while at the same time placing 
limits on state taxation of interstate commerce. 
Goldberg, 488 U.S. 252, 259 (1989) (internal citations omitted). 
42 Quill, 504 U.S. at 323 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating 
that the Court’s subsequent cases “disavowed” the “whole notion” underlying Bellas Hess
“that interstate commerce is immune from state taxation” (internal citation omitted)). 
43 Id. at 301. North Dakota declined to follow Bellas Hess because “‘the tremendous 
social, economic, commercial, and legal innovations’ of the past quarter-century have 
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In response, the Quill Court stated that it generally agreed with 
North Dakota’s analysis.44 The Court also recognized that 
“contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence might not dictate 
the same result [as in Bellas Hess] were the issue to arise for the 
first time today . . . .”45 But the Court nonetheless re-affirmed 
Bellas Hess.46
Quill not only retained Bellas Hess, it also effectively 
expanded the Court’s ruling in that case. Bellas Hess concluded 
that a vendor that limited its contacts with a state to those of 
mail and common carrier could not be subject to state tax—a rule 
that was generally limited to a mail-order vendor such as the 
litigant. Quill went further, concluding that an out-of-state 
business could not be subject to a state’s use tax collection duty 
unless it had an in-state “physical presence.”47 Quill was clear 
that physical presence would not exist if a vendor limited its 
state contacts to the use of mail and common carriers—hence 
preserving the Bellas Hess rule.48 But the definition of “physical 
presence” was otherwise ambiguous, as Justice White noted in his 
dissent,49 and as numerous state tax cases later illustrated.50 The 
saving grace, if there was one, was that the Court suggested that its 
rule was limited to the use tax collection duty51—something that 
later state cases would also generally affirm.52
Bellas Hess had been decided on both Commerce Clause and 
due process grounds—legal inquiries that the Court concluded 
were “closely related.”53 Bellas Hess stated that, notwithstanding 
the Court’s holding, Congress was free to create jurisdictional 
standards that would govern the assertion of a state’s use tax 
collection.54 But Quill noted that, despite the Court’s prior 
rendered its holding ‘obsole[te].’” Id. (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W. 2d 203, 208 
(N.D. 1991)). See State v. Quill, 470 N.W. 2d at 209–13 (citing Supreme Court cases 
indicating the change in the “legal landscape”). 
44 Quill, 504 U.S. at 301–02. 
45 Id. at 311. 
46 Id. at 301–02. 
47 Id. at 317–18. Bellas Hess never mentioned the phrase “physical presence.” See 
generally Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). 
48 Quill, 504 U.S. at 301. 
49 Id. at 337 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice White’s 
opinion in Quill was technically a concurrence in part and a dissent in part because he 
agreed with the Court’s due process analysis. But as Justice White disagreed with the 
holding and the physical presence rule more generally, this Article will refer to his 
opinion as a dissent. Id.
50 For cases decided in the immediate aftermath of Quill, see Michael T. Fatale, 
State Tax Jurisdiction and the Mythical ‘Physical Presence’ Constitutional Standard, 54 
TAX LAW. 105, 118–30 (2000).  
51 Quill, 504 U.S. at 314. 
52 See Fatale, supra note 22, at 583–584 n.106. 
53 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967). 
54 Id. at 760. 
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statement, Congress may have felt unable to act, because Congress 
cannot generally override due process protections.55 In order to 
make clear that Congress could act, Quill justified its re-affirmation 
of Bellas Hess only on Commerce Clause grounds.56
Quill overruled the component of Bellas Hess that determined 
that a mail-order vendor lacked sufficient due process connections 
with the state to be subject to tax.57 The Court in Quill noted that 
when a commercial actor’s efforts are “purposefully directed” 
toward residents of a state, physical contacts are not necessary 
for an assertion of jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.58
The Court observed that the state tax jurisdictional standard 
resembles that which is applied for purposes of determining 
adjudicative jurisdiction.59 It held that this standard was met on 
the facts since the taxpayer’s in-state activity consisted of the 
“continuous and widespread solicitation of business.”60 The Court 
noted that when these are the facts, a taxpayer “clearly has ‘fair 
warning that [its] activity may subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a 
foreign sovereign.’”61
Eight of the nine Justices in Quill supported the re-affirmation 
of Bellas Hess on stare decisis grounds. The majority opinion stated 
that “the Bellas Hess rule has engendered substantial reliance and 
has become part of the basic framework of a sizable industry.”62 It 
noted also that the “‘interest in stability and orderly development 
of the law’ that undergirds the doctrine of stare decisis, therefore 
counsels adherence to settled precedent.”63 This analysis helps 
explain how the majority could state a Commerce Clause rule that 
it simultaneously suggested was not supported by constitutional 
principles. But the three-person concurrence could not go so far, 
and aligned itself with the majority only on stare decisis 
grounds.64 Quill’s reliance analysis was also predicated, in part, 
on the conclusion that if the Court overruled Bellas Hess, vendors 
that had relied upon that prior holding could be liable for 
55 Quill, 504 U.S. at 318. 
56 Id. at 309–14. 
57 Id. at 306–08. 
58 Id. at 307–08 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 476 (1985)). 
59 Id.
60 Id. at 308.  
61 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 218 (1977) 
(Stevens, J., concurring)).  
62 Id. at 317. 
63 Id. (quoting Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190–91 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring)). 
64 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2092 (2018) (“Three Justices 
based their decision to uphold the physical presence rule on stare decisis alone.” (citing 
Quill, 504 U.S. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring))). Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Quill 
was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas. Quill, 504 U.S. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
See also Quill, 504 U.S. at 320 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“I would not revisit the merits of [the 
Bellas Hess] holding, but would adhere to it on the basis of stare decisis.”).  
26 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:1
“substantial” retroactive taxes.65 Justice White stated in his 
dissent that he believed this concern influenced the Court’s result.66
As in Bellas Hess, the Quill majority supported its 
constitutional ruling with the further conclusion that the states’ 
use tax collection laws were burdensome as applied to an 
out-of-state mail-order vendor.67 The Court referenced the 
balancing test applied to state regulations as set forth in the 
1970 dormant Commerce Clause case, Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc.68 Under that test, state laws that regulate commercial 
conduct can be struck down when they are unduly burdensome.69
But the Court’s analogy seemed inapt, as state taxes are not the 
equivalents of state regulations—and indeed, as the Court has 
stated, “are not regulations in any sense of that term.”70
Regulations imposed upon commercial conduct are often 
burdensome because individual states can impose conflicting rules 
that “materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state lines, 
or interfere with [such commerce] in matters with respect to which 
uniformity of regulation is of predominant national concern.”71 For 
example, Quill cited Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,72
where Iowa limited the size of certain trucks to a length that was 
not common in the adjacent states—a result that caused these 
trucks to sometimes travel longer distances merely to avoid Iowa.73
This resulted in private costs that the Court concluded exceeded 
the benefits to Iowa.74 A similar pre-Pike case is Southern 
Pacific Co. v. Arizona,75 cited by Wayfair, in which an Arizona 
law prohibited passenger trains with more than fourteen cars 
and prohibited freight trains with more than seventy cars 
where 93% to 95% of Arizona train traffic continued outside the 
state and acceptance of longer train lengths in other states was 
65 Quill, 504 U.S. at 317, 318 n.10. 
66 See id. at 332 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
67 See id. at 314 n.6. 
68 See id. at 312. The Court in Quill indirectly referenced the balancing test of Pike v. Bruce 
Church Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970), by citing the decision of Kassel v. Consol. Freightways 
Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981), which itself referenced the balancing test set forth in the Pike
decision. See Kassel, 450 U.S. at 670–71. 
69 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. 
70 Nw. Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 461 (1959).  
71 S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945). See John A. Swain, State Income 
Tax Jurisdiction: A Jurisprudential and Policy Perspective, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 319, 
340 (2003) (“[R]egulatory burdens cases typically involve a state regulation that is out of 
sync with neighboring states, or with states nationwide.”).  
72 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312. 
73 Kassel, 450 U.S. at 665, 674–75. 
74 See id. at 671–75, 678–79. 
75 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
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the “standard practice.”76 Because this was so, Southern Pacific
concluded that “the state interest is outweighed by the interest of 
the nation in an adequate, economical and efficient railway 
transportation service.”77
In contrast, the imposition of a state use tax collection duty 
does not materially restrict the free flow of commerce across state 
lines.78 As the Court has repeatedly stated when evaluating 
state taxes, “businesses engaged in interstate commerce may be 
required to pay their own way.”79 Also, while it is hypothetically 
possible that two states could attempt to apply sales or use tax to 
the same transaction, credits as applied between the states 
typically address that concern.80 Moreover, as a general matter 
the right of taxation is of greater importance to state sovereignty 
than the ability to merely regulate commercial conduct, as taxes 
fund all other state activity.81
Recognizing the differences between taxes and regulations, 
the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine applies different tests to 
evaluate the validity of each.82 By taking Pike, a rule that applies 
to the state regulation of commercial actors and adapting it to 
the imposition of a state tax, Quill stated an exception to these 
76 See S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 771; see also South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 
2080, 2091 (2018). 
77 S. Pac. Co., 325 U.S. at 783–84. 
78 See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1941) (rejecting the 
taxpayer’s claim that imposition of the state’s use tax collection duty resulted in “an 
unconstitutional burden on a foreign corporation”); see also Monamotor Oil Co. 
v. Johnson, 292 U.S. 86, 95 (1934) (“The [state] statute obviously was not intended to 
reach transactions in interstate commerce, but to tax the use of motor fuel after it had 
come to rest in Iowa, and the requirement that the appellant as the shipper into Iowa 
shall, as agent of the state, report and pay the tax on the gasoline thus coming into the 
state for use by others on whom the tax falls imposes no unconstitutional burden either 
upon interstate commerce or upon the appellant.”). 
79 See Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 259 (1989) (evaluating a tax imposed on 
interstate phone calls that the Court equated to a sales tax). See also Commonwealth Edison 
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 623–24 (1981) (“[I]t was not the purpose of the [C]ommerce 
[C]lause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce from their just share of [the] state 
tax burden even though it increases the cost of doing business.”) (quoting Colonial Pipeline 
Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100, 108 (1975) (evaluating the imposition of a use tax)). 
80 See, e.g., Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 192–94 (1995); 
Regency Transp. v. Comm’r of Revenue, 42 N.E.3d 1133, 1139–40 (Mass. 2016).  
81 See, e.g., Arkansas v. Farm Credit Servs. of Cent. Ark., 520 U.S. 821, 826 (1997) 
(“The States’ interest in the integrity of their own processes is of particular moment 
respecting questions of state taxation. . . . The power to tax is basic to the power of the 
State to exist.”); see also Michael T. Fatale, Common Sense: Implicit Constitutional 
Limitations on Congressional Preemptions of State Tax, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 41, 42 n.3, 
44 (2012) (citing cases and constitutional history); Hayes R. Holderness, Taking Due 
Process Seriously: The Give and Take of State Taxation, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 371, 385 & n.42 
(2017) (citing cases). 
82 See Fatale, supra note 81, at 60, 63–64 (noting that the Court has applied Pike
and a second test evaluating whether the state action is discriminatory to regulations, 
whereas taxes have been evaluated under a four-part test as stated in Complete Auto 
Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 278–79 (1977)).  
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otherwise distinct general rules. Quill seemed to defend its logic 
by suggesting that the use tax collection duty—the collection of 
tax by an intermediary—is akin to a regulation as opposed to the 
imposition of a tax.83 But the Court did so without explaining the 
break with its pre-existing cases, which were to the contrary.84
This faulty logic supports the notion that Quill’s analysis was 
more result-driven than doctrinal.85
In any event, although Quill referenced the Pike undue 
burden test, it did not apply that test—nor did it suggest to lower 
state courts that they were to apply that test—as the Court’s 
analysis was intended merely to reaffirm the holding in Bellas 
Hess and to posit a physical presence “bright-line” rule.86 The 
bright-line rule was to establish a “demarcation of a discrete 
realm of commercial activity that is free from interstate 
taxation”87—a proposition directly at odds with the thrust of the 
Court’s prior dormant Commerce Clause cases.88 Therefore, Quill
invoked Pike to support a result that was legally questionable 
even at the time of the Court’s decision.89
Although six Justices supported the Court’s undue burden 
reasoning in Bellas Hess, only five did so in Quill.90 Justice White in 
83 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992) (noting that the Court 
had previously ruled that that the dormant Commerce Clause “bars state regulations that 
unduly burden interstate commerce” (emphasis added) (citing Kassel v. Consolidated 
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981))); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 313 n.6 (referencing 
the special burdens that result from the use tax collection duty). Cf. Capital One Bank 
v. Comm’r of Revenue, 899 N.E.2d 76, 85 n.17 (Mass. 2009) (noting the special burdens 
that exist in the use tax collection context as evaluated in Quill, as compared to the lesser 
burdens that result from the imposition of a corporate income tax). See also Swain, supra 
note 71, at 339–43 (evaluating Quill as “a regulatory burdens case, not a tax case”).  
84 See, e.g., Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1941) (upholding a use 
tax collection duty imposed with respect to a vendor’s out-of-state mail-order sales as made 
to in-state consumers; concluding the tax and the related burdens were justified because 
they pertained to the vendor’s privilege of doing business in the state). See generally Fatale, 
supra note 81, at 60, 63–64. 
85 See Charles Rothfeld, Quill: Confusing the Commerce Clause, 56 TAX NOTES 487, 
491–92 (1992) (“[B]y purporting to find value in the ‘undue burdens’ analysis, the Court was 
able to justify leaving the Bellas Hess Commerce Clause holding in place while scrapping a 
due process ruling that (though no more vulnerable on the merits) stood as an obstacle to 
action by Congress.”) (concluding that Quill was effectively a “political decision” primarily 
intended to provoke action by Congress); see also Swain, supra note 71, at 342 (stating that 
in seeking to “find a substantive law justification for allowing the doctrine of stare decisis to 
control the outcome,” Quill, in part, “shoehorns its Commerce Clause burden concerns” into 
the nexus analysis).  
86 Quill, 504 U.S. at 305–06, 315, 317. 
87 Id. at 314–15. 
88 See supra notes 22–28, 41–45 and accompanying text. 
89 See id.
90 See Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 760 (1967) (Fortas, 
J., dissenting) (joined by Justice Black and Justice Douglas); see also Quill, 504 U.S. 
at 320–21 (Scalia, J., concurring) (joined by Justice Kennedy and Justice Thomas); id.
at 321–22 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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his Quill dissent recognized that a taxpayer could be subject to 
potentially unlawful “multiple tax burdens,”91 but concluded that there 
was no such threat on the facts of the case.92 The Quill majority, as 
noted, specifically punted the entire issue to Congress, and apparently 
expected that, having done so, Congress would act.93
Between Bellas Hess and Quill, the Court clarified the purpose 
inherent in its dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In the early 
twentieth century that purpose was to prevent states from imposing 
direct burdens on interstate commerce in order to protect free trade.94
In the latter part of the century the focus shifted to concerns about 
“economic protectionism” or “regulatory measures designed to benefit 
in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.”95
But with respect to the latter purpose, Quill also was out-of-step. The 
lower North Dakota court, reversed by Quill, noted that since “the 
‘very object’ of the Commerce Clause is protection of interstate 
business against discriminatory local practices, it would be ironic to 
exempt Quill from this burden and thereby allow it to enjoy a 
significant competitive advantage over local retailers.”96 But of course 
that is precisely what the Quill Court did.97
III. THE SOUTH DAKOTA STATUTE
The South Dakota statute at issue in Wayfair had its genesis in 
a prior action in which the state of Colorado sought to enhance its 
collection of use tax derived from sales made by out-of-state vendors 
lacking in-state physical presence.98 In that circumstance, Colorado 
required these vendors, sometimes referred to as “remote vendors,” 
to provide large dollar consumers with year-end statements as to 
their purchases.99 Colorado also required these vendors to provide 
the state’s revenue agency with the purchase information of such 
large dollar consumers.100 The general notion was that this notice 
91 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 326 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
92 See id. at 328 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
93 Id. at 318–19. 
94 See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text. 
95 See Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 337–38 (2008) (stating also, 
“[t]he modern law of what has come to be called the dormant Commerce Clause is driven 
by concern about ‘economic protectionism—that is, regulatory measures designed to 
benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state competitors.’”) (quoting New 
Energy Co. v. Linbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273–74 (1988)).  
96 Quill, 504 U.S. at 304 n.2 (quoting State v. Quill Corp., 470 N.W.2d 203, 214–15 
(N.D. 1991)). 
97 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2094 (2018) (“Quill puts both 
local businesses and many interstate businesses with physical presence at a competitive 
disadvantage relative to remote sellers.”).  
98 See State v. Wayfair, Inc., 901 N.W.2d 754, 757–58 (S.D. 2017) (citing Direct 
Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015)). 
99 Id.
100 Id.
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and reporting—similar to what the federal government requires 
using IRS Form 1099—would tend to increase self-reporting by 
individual consumers.  
Remote vendors that would be subject to the Colorado statute 
sued to enjoin its enforcement and succeeded in enjoining that 
statute for six years.101 Along the way, a dispute arose as to 
whether the case belonged in federal or state court, and that 
specific question ascended to the Supreme Court.102 The Court’s 
unanimous ruling, in Direct Marketing Ass’n v. Brohl, was that 
the case could be tried in federal court.103 However, the most 
significant thing about the Court’s decision was Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence. In that concurrence Justice Kennedy departed from 
the merits of the case to recognize that the Colorado statute was 
only enacted as a means through which the state could capture 
use tax revenue that it was proscribed from directly collecting 
from remote vendors because of Quill.104 Justice Kennedy, who 
was one of the Justices that previously concurred in Quill, stated 
that it was time for the Court to reconsider that earlier decision.105
The South Dakota statute was a response to Justice 
Kennedy’s entreaty in Direct Marketing Ass’n.106 The statute was 
passed in March of 2016.107 “The Act provided that any sellers of 
‘tangible personal property’ in South Dakota without a ‘physical 
presence in the state . . . shall remit’ sales tax according to the 
same procedures as sellers with ‘a physical presence.’”108 This 
collection obligation, however, was limited “to sellers with ‘gross 
revenue’ from sales in South Dakota of over $100,000 per 
calendar year or with 200 or more ‘separate transactions’ in the 
state within the same time frame.”109 The Act included provisions 
that ensured its immediate application and that enabled the 
state to bring an expedited declaratory action against vendors 
that were not in compliance.110 The Act also included several 
101 See Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 1132 (10th Cir. 2016). See also 
Direct Marketing Association Reaches Settlement with Colorado,  TAX NOTES: TAX
ANALYSTS (Feb. 24, 2017). 
102 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1135 (2015). 
103 Id. That later federal court case resolved in the State’s favor. See Direct Mktg. 
Ass’n, 814 F.3d at 1129. Justice (then-Judge) Gorsuch, who later sided with the State in 
Wayfair, concurred in the court’s decision and in so doing criticized Quill. Id. at 1148–51. 
104 Direct Mktg. Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. at 1134–35 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
105 Id.
106 See State v. Wayfair, 901 N.W.2d 754, 757–58 (S.D. 2017). 
107 Id. at 759 (citing S. 106, 2016 Legis. Assemb., 91st Sess. (S.D. 2016)). 
108 Id. at 758 (citing S.D. S. 106 § 1). 
109 Id. (citing S.D. S. 106 §§ 1–2). 
110 Id. (citing S.D. S. 106 §§ 2–3). 
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provisions that enjoined its enforcement while litigation was 
ongoing and that precluded retroactive enforcement.111
Litigation concerning the Act commenced in April of 2016.112
There were three vendors that took part in the litigation and the 
limited factual record was the same for each.113 Those facts, 
which were agreed to by the parties, were that each seller lacked 
a physical presence in South Dakota; each met the sales and 
transaction requirements for application of the Act; and no seller 
was registered to collect South Dakota sales tax.114 Because the 
Act did not require physical presence for the assertion of nexus, 
the State conceded that its statute was unconstitutional under 
Quill.115 Therefore, the State quickly lost two cases at the South 
Dakota circuit court and supreme court—the result that it 
wanted.116 The State then filed a petition for review with the 
United States Supreme Court.117
The Court took the case and rendered its decision in June of 
2018. The posture of the case—featuring a skeletal factual record 
and two parties that agreed with the legal analysis of the lower 
courts—was certainly unusual. And the speed with which the 
case got to the Court—a little over two years from the time that 
the state statute to be construed was enacted—was lightning 
fast. But as Justice Kennedy had previously stated in his Direct 
Marketing Ass’n concurrence, and the state legislation repeated 
in its justification for the law, the significance of the issue to a 
state was substantial.118 And as later noted in Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion in Wayfair, the Court had a special rationale for taking 
the case, as Quill represented a “false constitutional premise of 
the Court’s own creation.”119
111 Id. (citing S.D. S. 106 §§ 3, 5–6). 
112 Id. at 759. 
113 Id.
114 Id. at 759–60. 
115 Id. at 760. 
116 See id. at 760–61 (referencing the lower court’s decision “based on undisputed 
statements of material fact and the parties’ briefs” and also noting the state supreme 
court’s affirmation of that lower court decision). During the litigation, the State also 
succeeded in contesting the taxpayers’ attempt to move the case to federal court. See 
generally South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 229 F. Supp. 3d 1026 (D.S.D. 2017). 
117 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 12, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 
(2018) (No. 17-494), 2017 WL 4404984 *12.  
118 Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 1134–35 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring); 
Wayfair, 901 N.W. 2d at 765–67 (quoting S.B. 106 §§ 8-9, 2016 Legis. Assemb., 91st Sess. 
(S.D. 2016)). 
119 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2096 (2018). 
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IV. THE WAYFAIR ANALYSIS
Some aspects of the Wayfair decision are less than clear 
because the result was 5-4 and the two concurring Justices 
clearly disagreed with the three other Justices in the majority on 
certain issues. The analysis below probes the decision, including 
the differences among the Justices. 
A. Physical Presence and State Sovereignty  
One thing that was clear in Wayfair was the Court’s ultimate 
conclusion pertaining to its prior construction of the dormant 
Commerce Clause. The Court concluded that the “[t]he physical 
presence rule of Quill is unsound and incorrect,” and that Quill
and Bellas Hess “should be, and now are, overruled.”120 Both 
cases needed to be overruled because, although the physical 
presence rule was only specifically stated in Quill, the rule was a 
general re-affirmation of the logic in Bellas Hess.121 The Court 
stated that Quill was “wrong on its own terms when it was 
decided in 1992” and “since then the Internet revolution has 
made its earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.”122
The Court’s holding was by a 5-4 vote, but there was no 
question concerning the antipathy of all nine Justices to the 
pre-existing physical presence rule. Within the majority, Justice 
Thomas stated in concurrence that Bellas Hess and Quill “can no 
longer be rationally justified,”123 and Justice Gorsuch noted in 
concurrence that Bellas Hess and Quill were a “mistake.”124
Justice Thomas went so far as to state that he should have joined 
Justice White’s dissent in Quill, which was harshly critical of the 
Quill physical presence rule,125 and Justice Gorsuch similarly 
cited the White dissent favorably.126 Even Chief Justice Roberts’ 
four-person dissenting opinion concluded that, although he would 
have retained the physical presence rule on stare decisis 
grounds, “Bellas Hess was wrongly decided.”127 Underlying all of 
these statements was the notion that Bellas Hess and Quill were 
120 Id. at 2099. 
121 See id. at 2091–92. 
122 Id. at 2097. 
123 Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 
U.S. 298, 333 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
124 Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
125 Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 322 (White, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)).  
126 Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 329 (White, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part)). 
127 Id. at 2101 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Presumably, Chief Justice Roberts could 
not call Quill a mistake, given the prior decision in Bellas Hess that Quill re-affirmed, 
invoking stare decisis, and his later vote for stare decisis in Wayfair. See id.
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mistaken specifically because the cases retained vestiges of the 
Court’s pre-existing “free trade” doctrine.128
Wayfair’s rejection of the physical presence rule as a dormant 
Commerce Clause requirement also finally resolved, implicitly and 
without fanfare, the question of whether physical presence was 
required in any other state tax context—including in particular for 
purposes of state corporate income tax.129 Although the physical 
presence rule as established by Quill was limited to the states’ use 
tax collection duty, numerous taxpayers and practitioners claimed 
in the aftermath of the case that the rule also applied in the 
corporate income tax area.130 The state cases that evaluated this 
question almost invariably ruled that it did not—and most of these 
cases were denied certiorari by the Supreme Court.131 But 
taxpayers and practitioners continued to claim that the issue 
remained unresolved, arguing that the precedential value of 
the state cases was limited to their jurisdictions, and to their 
facts.132 Taxpayers and practitioners generally claimed that only a 
Supreme Court decision could finally resolve the question. 
Wayfair’s unanimous denunciation of the physical presence rule 
finally accomplished that resolution. 
Another clear aspect of the Wayfair decision was the Court’s 
determination that the physical presence rule is in conflict with 
principles of state sovereignty. The Court noted “the necessity of 
allowing the States the power to enact laws to implement the 
political will of their people.”133 It stated that “[t]he physical 
presence rule . . . is not just a technical legal problem—it is an 
extraordinary imposition by the Judiciary on the States’ 
authority to collect taxes and perform critical public functions.”134
The Court stated that, “[i]f it becomes apparent that the Court’s 
Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the States from exercising 
their lawful sovereign powers in our federal system, the Court 
should be vigilant in correcting the error.”135 Justices Thomas 
128 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 322–24 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part); see also supra notes 22–46 and accompanying text.  
129 See, e.g., Andrea Muse, Wells Fargo Adjusts Income Tax Reserves Following 
Wayfair, TAX NOTES (July 23, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/editors-pick/wells-fargo-
adjusts-income-tax-reserves-following-wayfair [http://perma.cc/AR3R-RT8A]. 
130 See Fatale, supra note 50, at 130–41; Fatale, supra note 22, at 583–84 n.106. 
131 See Fatale, supra note 22, at 583–84 n.106. 
132 See, e.g., Reply Brief Amicus Curiae of the Council on State Taxation in Support of 
Appellant at 11–12, Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900 (Ohio 2016) (No. 15-0386).  
133 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 (2018). 
134 Id. at 2095. 
135 Id. at 2096. Similarly, the Court acknowledged that there could be legal questions 
about state implementation of its decision but stated that prospect “cannot justify 
retaining [an] . . . anachronistic rule that deprives States of vast revenues from major 
businesses.” Id. at 2099.  
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and Gorsuch in their concurring opinions were not as explicit in 
revering state sovereignty, but both made clear that they do not 
accept the full breadth of the Court’s dormant Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence, because pursuant to that case law “courts may 
invalidate state laws that offend no congressional statute.”136
Antipathy to the dormant Commerce Clause is effectively an 
endorsement of state sovereignty because the doctrine imposes 
significant limitations upon the states’ sovereign rights.137
One of the more significant questions posed at the Wayfair
oral argument and in the parties’ briefs was whether the striking 
of the physical presence rule would be retroactive in its effect.138
It had been widely thought after Quill that a primary reason that 
North Dakota lost that case was because the State’s attorney told 
the Court that, if the State won, it would seek retroactive 
taxes.139 In Wayfair, the State of South Dakota and the states 
that joined South Dakota as amici knew that the Court would 
be concerned with this issue and attempted to address it.140 But 
it was nonetheless generally assumed by the parties that if 
Wayfair overturned Quill, the ruling would be retroactive.141
Wayfair fulfilled this expectation.142 The Court did not declare an 
136 Id. at 2100 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). Justice Thomas stated 
more generally, similar to his numerous prior statements (see, e.g., McBurney v. Young, 569 
U.S. 221, 237 (2013)), that the Court’s entire dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence “can no 
longer be rationally justified.” Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 333 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (noting that the dormant Commerce Clause is “unmoored from any constitutional 
text” and has resulted in court decisions evaluating “state action far afield from the 
discriminatory taxes it was primarily designed to check”). 
137 See, e.g., Fatale, supra note 81, at 55–66. 
138 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. 
Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494), 2018 WL 1811984 (the Court refers to retroactivity four 
times); see also Petitioner’s Brief at 48–51, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 
(2018) (No. 17-494); Respondents’ Brief at 62–65, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. 
Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 17-494). 
139 See Billy Hamilton, Remembrance of Things Not So Past: The Story Behind the Quill 
Decision, 59 ST. TAX NOTES MAG. 807, 809–10 (2011); Fatale, supra note 81, at 86 & n.267. 
140 See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 138, at 48–51; Brief For Colorado and 40 
Other States, Two United States Territories, and the District of Columbia as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18–21, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 
(2018) (No. 17-494). 
141 See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 138, at 62; see also Transcript Oral Argument, 
supra note 138, at 51 (“[T]his Court has indicated that a purely prospective ruling is 
inconsistent with its view of the law and made that very clear in the—in the Harper 
case.”) (statement of the attorney for the respondent, Wayfair, referencing Harper v. Va. 
Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86 (1993)). Quill of course also assumed that a decision for the 
State would have been retroactive—which may have influenced the Court in finding 
against the State of North Dakota. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text.  
142 The Court noted repeatedly that there would be no retroactivity with respect to 
the South Dakota law in question because the law itself—and not the Court’s construction 
of the Constitution—foreclosed this possibility. See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. 
Ct. 2080, 2089, 2098 (2018). The Court also noted that if a state sought to apply a similar 
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exception to the general jurisprudential rule that its constitutional 
holdings are given retroactive effect.143 Rather, it made clear that, 
post-Wayfair, the physical presence rule would not apply to prior 
tax periods.144 Instead, the Court suggested that retroactive 
assertions of tax jurisdiction could potentially raise other 
constitutional issues.145
B. Discrimination and Double Taxation  
Wayfair is consistent with the Court’s modern Commerce Clause 
precedent in that it posits that the purpose of the Commerce Clause 
is to prevent “economic discrimination.”146 In contrast, Quill was 
problematic because it created “market distortions” and “artificial 
competitive advantages.”147 Post-Wayfair, the discrimination 
principle will not typically have any application to the imposition of a 
state’s use tax collection duty since the effect of that imposition is 
merely to place in-state and out-of-state vendors on equal footing.148
Wayfair seemingly acknowledged this consequence when it stated 
that “[c]omplex state tax systems could have the effect of 
discriminating against interstate commerce” but that, of relevance, 
“in-state businesses pay the taxes as well.”149
Wayfair also suggested state laws that are not uniform 
could have the effect of discriminating against interstate 
commerce—which, the Court noted, state membership in the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA) would help 
to address.150 The Court’s cryptic reasoning, however, is logical 
only if one assumes that the application of these “complex state 
statute retroactively in a case where consumers had already self-reported the tax, the 
state could potentially be accused of imposing an unlawful double tax. Id. at 2099. These 
issues, the Court stated, “are not before the Court in the instant case; but their potential 
to arise in some later case cannot justify retaining this artificial, anachronistic rule that 
deprives States of vast revenues from major businesses.” Id.
143 See Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 90 (1993). 
144 The Court noted the prospect that the decision could have retroactive effect 
pursuant to the law of a state other than South Dakota, where the state statute itself 
foreclosed this possibility. Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098–99. The Court concluded that such 
treatment in another state was an issue for a later day. Id. at 2099.  
145 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. For example, there could be a retroactivity issue 
arising under the Due Process Clause. See infra notes 200–202 and accompanying text.  
146 138 S. Ct. at 2093–94; see also supra note 95 and accompanying text. 
147 138 S. Ct. at 2092, 2094. 
148 See Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364–65 (1941) (“A tax or 
other burden obviously does not discriminate against interstate commerce where 
‘equality is its theme.’”) (citing Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577, 583–586 
(1937); McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33, 48–49 (1940); see also 
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094, 2096 (noting that the Commerce Clause was intended to put 
in-state and out-of-state commercial actors on an “even playing field” and that the Quill
physical presence rule was inconsistent with that goal). 
149 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
150 Id. at 2099–100. 
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tax systems” could somehow result in an impermissible double 
tax—perhaps by enabling a state to claim a taxable sale that 
logically belongs to a second state.151 Such a consequence would be 
somewhat reminiscent of the Court’s recent decision in Comptroller 
of the Treasury v. Wynne.152 Although Wynne is not referenced in 
the Wayfair majority opinion, it may have influenced the Court’s 
reasoning.153 But such double taxation under the state’s sales tax 
laws is unusual and, in any event, is generally addressed, when it 
occurs, through the conferral of a state tax credit.154
The Court also made the peculiar statement that:  
Others [i.e., certain non-litigant interested parties] have argued that 
retroactive liability risks a double tax burden in violation of the 
Court’s apportionment jurisprudence because it would make both the 
buyer and the seller legally liable for collecting and remitting the tax 
on a transaction intended to be taxed only once.155
The Court’s suggestion is that if a state required a vendor to 
collect use tax on a retroactive basis, it could effectively be 
imposing double tax because the consumer might have already 
independently submitted the tax. This statement is peculiar in 
part because it is attributed not to the Court’s own logic, but to 
persons that were not litigants in the case. Also—perhaps 
explaining the Court’s ambivalence—double taxation does not 
necessarily result in a constitutional infringement.156 Further, as 
the Court noted, one of the difficulties that the states faced when 
applying the Quill physical presence rule was that very few 
consumers independently submit use tax.157
151 Id. at 2099. The Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board filed an amicus brief in 
the Wayfair case that referenced the various ways in which SSUTA helps make state laws 
uniform. See generally Brief for Amicus Curiae Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, 
Inc. In Support of Petitioner, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018) (No. 
17-494). That brief did not make any claim that SSUTA serves to address state tax 
discrimination—and in fact never mentions “discrimination”—but did state that SSUTA 
includes “uniform sourcing rules to prevent double taxation.” See id. at 14. 
152 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1801–06 (2015) (pertaining to a state personal income tax).  
153 Wynne, like Wayfair, was a 5-4 decision. See id. at 1791. Justice Alito was the 
author of Wynne. Id. It was commonly thought after the Wayfair hearing that South 
Dakota had four votes—Justices Kennedy, Thomas, Gorsuch, and Ginsburg—but not 
necessarily a fifth. See, e.g., Michael Cullers, Oyez! The Supreme Court Hears Oral 
Arguments in Wayfair, and Now We Play the Waiting Game, PUB. FIN. L. BLOG (Apr. 26, 2008), 
https://www.publicfinancetaxblog.com/2018/04/oyez-the-supreme-court-hears-oral-arguments-
in-wayfair-and-now-we-play-the-waiting-game/ [http://perma.cc/3RW4-K4FP]. It seems 
fair to speculate that the Court’s double tax verbiage was what helped to secure Justice 
Alito’s deciding vote.  
154 See Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 194–95 (1995). 
155 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors and 
Economists in Support of Petitioner, at 7, South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 
(No. 17-494)).  
156 See, e.g., Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 170–71 (1983). 
157 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2088; see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 135 S. Ct. 1124, 
1135 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION,
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C. Due Process 
1. The Nexus Implications of Wayfair
Implicitly, when Wayfair conceded that the physical presence 
rule derived from Bellas Hess and Quill was incorrect, it re-posited 
that the relevant nexus considerations are based in due process. This 
is because both Bellas Hess and Quill recognized that absent the 
notion of physical presence, the jurisdictional rules are primarily 
those of due process.158
The Court’s analysis of Due Process Clause and Commerce 
Clause nexus in Bellas Hess and Quill was intertwined such that 
Wayfair felt obliged to overrule both cases in their entirety, but 
the Court was nonetheless clear that it was only the physical 
presence rule that it rejected.159 Moreover, in the absence of 
Bellas Hess and Quill, constitutional nexus must be derivative of 
due process principles, since this was clearly the law prior to 
Bellas Hess, and was generally the law even between those two 
cases.160 The majority decision in Wayfair heavily relied upon 
Justice White’s dissent in Quill.161 Moreover, Justices Thomas and 
Gorsuch in their concurrences both specifically aligned themselves 
REVENUE ESTIMATE: ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND MAIL ORDER SALES, REV. 8/13, at 7 
(2013), https://www.boe.ca.gov/legdiv/pdf/e-commerce-08-21-13F.pdf [http://perma.cc/TGR6-
QP2L] (estimating the rate of compliance at 4%)).  
158 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. See also Quill Corp. v. North 
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 325–27 (1992) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(stating, inter alia, that the Court has “never . . . found . . . sufficient contacts for due 
process purposes but an insufficient nexus under the Commerce Clause” and that 
Complete Auto makes clear that the Court’s nexus requirement is traceable to concerns 
“grounded in the Due Process Clause”); Rothfeld, supra note 85, at 488 (noting that the 
Court’s Commerce Clause nexus rule prior to Quill was “borrowed wholesale from 
decisions involving the Due Process Clause”).  
159 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“Physical presence is not necessary to create a 
substantial nexus.”); id. at 2099 (“[T]he physical presence rule of Quill is unsound and 
incorrect.”). Hence, Wayfair cites favorably both Bellas Hess and Quill in its due process 
analysis. See id. at 2093. 
160 Quill, 504 U.S. at 325–27 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(stating, inter alia, that when the Court announced its decision in the 1977 case, Complete 
Auto, “the nexus requirement was definitely traceable to concerns grounded in the Due 
Process Clause”); see also Trinova Corp. v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 373 
(1991) (the four tests set forth in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 
(1977), including the nexus test, “while responsive to Commerce Clause dictates, 
encompas[s] as well the due process requirement that there be a ‘minimal connection’ 
between the interstate activities and the taxing State, and a rational relationship 
between the income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the enterprise”); 
Quill, 504 U.S. at 314 (acknowledging the Court’s retreat between Bellas Hess and Quill
“from the formalistic constrictions of a stringent physical presence test in favor of a more 
flexible substantive approach” (internal citation omitted)).  
161 The Court referred favorably to Justice White’s dissent four times. See Wayfair,
138 S. Ct. at 2092, 2094, 2096–97. 
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with White’s dissent.162 In that dissent, Justice White specifically 
stated that nexus is primarily a due process inquiry.163
The context in which Wayfair was decided also supports the 
conclusion that the state tax nexus inquiry is now generally a 
due process test. Subsequent to Quill, most state courts that 
considered the issue eventually concluded that the physical 
presence rule did not apply to other state taxes, and in particular 
to the corporate income tax.164 In that context, these courts 
generally determined nexus by relying upon due process 
principles.165 At the Wayfair hearing, the point was made that 
dispensing with the physical presence rule would not be 
problematic specifically because there has been little difficulty in 
applying the nexus analysis in these other state court cases.166
The Wayfair majority seemed to accept that argument.  
2. The Substance of the Nexus Test 
Although its analysis was brief, Wayfair also made clear the 
substance of the due process inquiry.167 The Court cited Bellas 
Hess for the proposition that the Commerce Clause “nexus 
requirement is ‘closely related’ to the due process requirement 
that there be ‘some definite link, some minimum connection, 
between a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks 
to tax.’”168 Also, the Court stated that although in the tax area 
Due Process and Commerce Clause nexus standards “may not be 
identical or conterminous . . . there are significant parallels.”169
Quill had noted that the rules that apply for purposes of 
due process nexus are similar to those that apply for purposes 
of adjudicative jurisdiction.170 Wayfair is consistent with this 
conclusion because it cites favorably both Quill and Burger King 
Corp. v. Rudzewicz,171 an adjudicative jurisdiction case, when 
162 Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
163 See Quill, 504 U.S. 325–27 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
The four-person Wayfair dissent may also have generally accepted the Quill reasoning of 
Justice White, consistent with the analysis in the Wayfair majority opinion. See Wayfair,
138 S. Ct. at 2010 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“I agree that Bellas Hess was wrongly 
decided, for many of the reasons given by the Court.”). 
164 See Fatale, supra note 22, at 583–84 n.106. 
165 See id. at 583–85. 
166 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 4–5, 56–57.  
167 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093.  
168 Id. at 2093 (citing Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967) 
and Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954)). 
169 Id.
170 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1992). See also id. at 319 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is difficult to discern any principled basis for distinguishing 
between jurisdiction to regulate and jurisdiction to tax.”). 
171 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
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evaluating due process nexus.172 As stated by Quill, the Court 
has often identified “‘notice’ or ‘fair warning’ as the analytic 
touchstone of due process nexus analysis.”173 This standard is 
satisfied where a commercial actor’s efforts are “purposefully 
directed” toward the residents of a state.174 For example, in 
Wayfair, the nexus standard was met where the respondents had 
sufficient “economic and virtual contacts . . . with the State.”175
Further, the Court’s precedents make clear that this standard 
can be satisfied by either direct or indirect contacts—for example, 
contacts that are effected through an intermediary.176 Although 
physical presence is no longer necessary to establish nexus, it is 
sufficient to create nexus, whether or not that presence relates to 
the company’s in-state sales.177
Wayfair specifically concluded that the Commerce Clause 
“substantial nexus” requirement is met “when the taxpayer 
[or collector] ‘avails itself of the substantial privilege of carrying on 
business’ in that jurisdiction.”178 For this proposition, the Court 
quoted Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez.179 But, as Polar 
Tankers makes clear, this standard ultimately derives from the 
due process analysis in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner of Taxes 
of Vermont.180 It might seem odd at first blush that the Court’s 
172 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 308 and Burger King 
Corp., 471 U.S. at 476). 
173 Quill, 504 U.S. at 312 (stating also, “[d]ue process centrally concerns the 
fundamental fairness of governmental activity”). 
174 See id. at 307–08; see also J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 
877 (2011). 
175 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
176 See Fatale, supra note 22, at 619–21 (discussing J. McIntyre Machinery, 564 U.S. 873 
and Asahi Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Calif., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)). 
177 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093 (“Physical presence is not necessary to create a 
substantial nexus.”) (emphasis added); see also Quill, 504 U.S. at 330 (White, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (noting that under the Court’s pre-Quill precedent, 
for example, Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 560–62 
(1977), mail-order sellers are subject to use tax collection when “they have some 
presence in the taxing state even if that activity has no relation to the transaction 
being taxed”). Nat’l Geographic was cited favorably by Wayfair. See 138 S. Ct. at 
2098, 2094. Cf. Crutchfield Corp. v. Testa, 88 N.E.3d 900, 912–13 (Ohio 2016) (concluding 
that physical presence is a sufficient but not necessary condition for applying a state corporate 
gross receipts tax). 
178 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (quoting Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 
1, 11 (2009)). 
179 557 U.S. 1 (2009) (case pertaining to a city’s personal property tax imposed upon 
the value of large ships traveling to and from such city). 
180 Id. at 11 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. Comm’r of Taxes of Vt., 445 U.S. 425, 437 
(1980)). The analysis in Mobil Oil, in turn, derived from the Court’s due process holding in 
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney, 311 U.S. 435, 444–45 (1940). See Mobil Oil, 445 U.S. at 437 
(citing to J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444–45); J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444–45 
(stating that when evaluating due process as applied to the imposition of a state tax “[t]he 
simple but controlling question is whether the state has given anything for which it can 
ask return”); see also Holderness, supra note 81, at 381–84 (discussing the due process 
test stated by J.C. Penney Co.).
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important re-affirmation of the purposeful availment principle 
relies on language in a somewhat aberrational case focused on 
one of the Constitution’s least-known provisions, the so-called 
“Tonnage Clause.”181 But the Court obviously sought to cite a 
post-Quill precedent, and it had not taken any nexus cases 
subsequent to Quill.182
3. Nexus in Application  
Wayfair evaluated how the nexus analysis would apply to 
facts like those at issue and to the specific facts in question. 
Specifically, the Court noted that the South Dakota Act only 
applied to sellers that delivered more than $100,000 of goods or 
services into South Dakota or engaged in 200 or more separate 
transactions for the delivery of goods into the state on an annual 
basis.183 It stated that “[t]his quantity of business could not have 
occurred unless the seller availed itself of the substantial 
privilege of carrying on business in South Dakota.”184 The Court 
allowed for the prospect that in the abstract some remote vendors 
could have only “de minimis contacts” with the state, but the 
Court’s analysis seems to foreclose this possibility in any case 
where the South Dakota thresholds are met.185
More generally, Wayfair implicitly concluded that the nexus 
requirement for use tax collection would be satisfied in any state 
where a vendor exceeded nexus thresholds substantially identical to 
those of South Dakota.186 By way of comparison, in the corporate 
income tax area, the states have utilized different sales thresholds 
for asserting “factor presence” economic nexus, and such thresholds 
are sometimes higher in high-population states.187 But Wayfair does 
181 See Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 4–5. 
182 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (citing Polar Tankers with respect to the rule as to 
substantial nexus “[i]n the absence of Quill and Bellas Hess”). Cf. MeadWestvaco Corp. 
v. Ill. Dep’t of Revenue, 553 U.S. 16, 24–25 (2008) (“The ‘broad inquiry’ subsumed in [the 
Commerce Clause and due process] constitutional requirements [in state tax matters] is 
‘whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to protection, 
opportunities and benefits given by the state’’’—that is, “whether the state has given 
anything for which it can ask return.”) (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho Tax Comm’n, 458 
U.S. 307, 315 (1982), in turn quoting J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. at 444). 
183 Id. at 2099 (citing S.B. 106 § 1, 2016 Leg., Gen. Sess. (S.D. 2016)).  
184 Id.
185 See id.; see also id. at 2098–99 (noting that “[t]he law at issue requires a merchant 
to collect the tax only if it does a considerable amount of business in the State” and that 
the law “applies a safe harbor to those who transact only limited business” in the state).  
186 See id. at 2099. Cf. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 296, 308 (1992) (holding 
that when a corporation engages in “continuous and widespread solicitation of business 
within a State. . . . [s]uch a corporation clearly has ‘fair warning that [its] activity may 
subject [it] to the jurisdiction of a foreign sovereign’” (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 
186, 218 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring))).  
187 See, e.g., The State Income Tax Consequences of Wayfair, BDO (Aug. 2018), 
https://www.bdo.com/insights/tax/state-and-local-tax/the-state-income-tax-consequences-
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not suggest that the jurisdictional thresholds to be used for 
purposes of the states’ use tax collection duties must be based upon 
a state’s population. Wayfair concluded that the thresholds used by 
South Dakota, a small population state, pertained to companies 
whose business in the state was “substantial”—a concept that the 
Court evaluated in the abstract.188 In the case briefs and at oral 
argument, questions were raised about whether it would be 
appropriate for a state to assert jurisdiction over a vendor making 
only a single sale into the state where presumably that sale 
exceeded the state’s $100,000 threshold189 or, alternatively, over a 
vendor making 200 sales where each of those individual sales were 
a very low dollar amount (say $2).190 But Wayfair suggests no 
constitutional concern with either fact pattern. 
As noted, Quill stated that the due process tax jurisdiction 
rules generally track the standards applied to determine 
adjudicative jurisdiction.191 In that latter context, there have been 
cases in recent years questioning whether a single sale made with 
respect to a state would suffice.192 But the Court has also stated—as 
Wayfair itself did—that the state tax jurisdiction and adjudicative 
jurisdiction standards are not identical.193 To the extent that there 
are differences, the Court has inferred that it is the adjudicative 
jurisdiction principles that are more rigorous.194 Because Wayfair
expressed no specific concern with the assertion of state tax 
jurisdiction when a taxpayer makes only a single large-dollar sale 
into a state—unlike in the Court’s recent adjudicative jurisdiction 
cases—it generally supports that point.  
of-wayfair [http://perma.cc/D9UG-NLX3] (noting factor-presence corporate income tax 
statutes in New York, Ohio, Michigan, and Washington that originally asserted nexus 
based on in-state sales of $1,000,000, $500,000, $350,000, and $250,000, respectively). 
188 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. See also supra notes 183–185 and accompanying text. 
Similarly, a recent congressional bill that would have addressed Quill, which passed the 
Senate but not the House, would have required a remote Internet vendor to collect use tax in 
every state where such vendor had more than $1 million in total Internet sales—irrespective 
of its sales volume in any particular state. See also Fatale, supra note 22, at 633–36 
(discussing the Marketplace Fairness Act, S. 336, S. 743, H.R. 684 113th Cong. (2013)). 
189 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 26–28, 36, 48, 57. 
190 See id. at 54–55. 
191 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308. 
192 See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) 
(Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer, who authored the concurring opinion in McIntyre
that focused on this point, see id., also explored the issue at the Wayfair oral argument. 
See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138, at 24. 
193 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 319–20 (Scalia, J., concurring); Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093. 
194 See Fatale, supra note 22, at 622–25. In general, this is because adjudicative 
jurisdiction raises difficult questions about choice of law and full faith and credit—questions 
that do not generally arise in the state tax context. See id. Also, in the state tax context, 
invariably—unlike in many of the adjudicative jurisdiction cases—the commercial actor 
will have targeted the economic market of the taxing state. See id. at 619–22.  
42 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:1
Wayfair also commented on the specific in-state contacts of the 
respondents, large Internet vendors. The Court noted that, given the 
facts, “nexus is clearly sufficient based on both the economic and 
virtual contacts respondents have with the State.”195 The 
respondents’ economic contacts exceeded the state’s statutory nexus 
thresholds—thresholds which the Court stated each respondent 
“easily meets.”196 The Court also noted that the respondents were 
“large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive 
virtual presence.”197 Although there were no specific facts in evidence 
on this point, the Court suggested that a modern vendor engaged in 
e-commerce likely would have a website that leaves “cookies saved to 
[its] customers’ hard drives” or an app that its customers could 
download onto their phones.198 The Court also said that such a 
vendor might make use of an in-state “virtual showroom.”199
One other aspect of due process suggested by Wayfair pertains to 
the prospect that a state might seek to apply a use tax collection 
nexus law like that of South Dakota retroactively. As due process 
jurisdiction requires notice or fair warning,200 retroactive taxation 
can potentially raise due process concerns. This is particularly so in 
the context of a use tax collection duty, since to perform this 
collection the vendor needs to have knowledge of the rule at the time 
of the transaction. Wayfair generally discusses the retroactivity issue 
as suggesting one way a state might engage in discrimination or 
impose an undue burden on a taxpayer—claims that would arise 
under the Commerce Clause and not the Due Process Clause.201
195 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. Cf. Quill, 504 U.S. at 307, 312 (noting that the due 
process test is “minimum contacts”).  
196 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2089.  
197 Id. at 2099. It also made reference to “the continuous and pervasive virtual 
presence of retailers” and their “substantial virtual connections.” Id. at 2095. 
198 Id. The Court made reference to the fact that two states, Massachusetts and Ohio, 
had rules that specifically asserted jurisdiction on this basis. Id. at 2098–99 (citing 830 
MASS. CODE REGS. 64 H.1.7 (2017) and OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5741.01(I)(2)(c)(1) (2018)). 
Similarly, Quill had suggested that if a remote vendor owned or otherwise had a property 
interest in a significant amount of in-state software that ownership interest would confer 
an in-state physical presence. See Quill, 504 U.S. at 315 n.8.  
199 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094–95. Some persons have noted that the “substantial 
virtual connections” of an out-of-state vendor like those at issue in the case, id. at 2095, 
could have the effect of causing the vendor to lose the state corporate income tax protection 
that might otherwise be conferred by the federal statute, commonly referred to as Public 
Law 86-272. See Act of Sep. 14, 1959, Pub.L. No. 86-272, § 101, 73 Stat. 555). See, e.g., Jaye
Calhoun & William J. Kolarik II, Implications of the Supreme Court’s Historic Decision in 
Wayfair, TAX NOTES (July 23, 2018), https://www.taxnotes.com/state-tax-today/sales-
and-use-taxation/implications-supreme-courts-historic-decision-wayfair/2018/07/23/2866l 
[http://perma.cc/W4KV-JJ2L].  
200 See Quill, 504 U.S. at 308, 312.  
201 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (“South Dakota’s tax system includes several 
features that appear designed to prevent discrimination against or undue burdens upon 
interstate commerce. . . . [including that] the Act ensures that no obligation to remit the 
sales tax may be applied retroactively.”); see also supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
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But that may be because Wayfair involved primarily a Commerce 
Clause and not a due process claim. Wayfair generally acknowledged 
that other non-Commerce Clause arguments might also be available 
to prospective claimants and suggested that due process would be a 
basis for one such argument.202
D. Undue Burden 
1. Background and Derivation 
The most confusing aspect of Wayfair is the undue burden 
analysis. Both Bellas Hess and Quill made reference to the 
burdens that could be faced by vendors seeking to comply with 
the states’ use tax collection duties, though neither holding was 
justified primarily on that basis. Bellas Hess was primarily 
premised on the notion that mail-order sales are intrinsically 
interstate transactions, and therefore could not be subject to 
state tax under the Court’s pre-existing Commerce Clause 
doctrine.203 That notion was later rejected by the Supreme Court 
in Complete Auto.204 Quill was primarily justified on the theory 
that mail-order vendors had relied upon Bellas Hess for 
twenty-five years and that the Court should therefore respect 
this reliance interest.205 Quill recognized that the legal 
underpinnings for Bellas Hess had been removed, and so sought 
to buttress its decision on some other Commerce Clause basis.206
Also, the Court considered the matter one that could best be 
resolved by Congress.207 Identifying an independent Commerce 
Clause rationale allowed the Court to bifurcate Quill’s Commerce 
Clause and Due Process Clause analyses, and thereby specifically 
suggest re-consideration by Congress.208
Quill implicitly distinguished between the imposition of a 
use tax collection duty and the levy of a state tax. Quill
analogized the former duty to a state’s regulation of a 
commercial actor, as opposed to the levy of a state tax, and, in 
so doing, referenced the dormant Commerce Clause balancing 
202 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (“[I]f some small businesses with only de minimis 
contacts seek relief from collection systems thought to be a burden, those entities may still 
do so under other theories.”) (emphasis added). See Quill, 504 U.S. at 305 (“If there is a 
want of due process to sustain the tax, by that fact alone any burden the tax imposes on 
the commerce among the states becomes ‘undue.’”) (quoting International Harvester Co. 
v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 353 (1944) (Rutledge, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)). 
203 Nat’l Bellas Hess v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 759–760 (1967). 
204 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091; see also supra notes 40–42 and accompanying text.  
205 See supra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
206 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
207 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 318 (1992). 
208 Id.; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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test from Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.209 Under Pike’s “undue 
burden” test, “[s]tate laws that ‘regulat[e] even-handedly to 
effectuate a legitimate local public interest . . . will be upheld 
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive 
in relation to the putative local benefits.’”210 But Quill did not 
engage in any balancing or set forth a test that would require 
balancing—it merely utilized the notion of an undue burden as the 
basis for the creation of the Court’s “bright-line physical presence” 
rule.211 The Court’s theory was that application of the physical 
presence rule would police against undue burdens resulting from 
the imposition of a use tax collection duty.212 Also, the Court’s 
physical presence rule would protect the mail-order reliance 
interests created by Bellas Hess, because the physical presence 
rule subsumed the holding of that earlier case. But the Quill
Court’s overriding rationale seemed to be that, however faulty its 
case logic, Congress would soon act to address the mail-order use 
tax issue—which of course it never did.213 Three of the eight 
Justices in Quill—including Justices Kennedy and Thomas, both 
of whom were in the Wayfair majority—disagreed with Quill’s
Commerce Clause reasoning and said that they would support the 
holding only on the basis of stare decisis.214
In Wayfair, the undue burden test was first considered in 
the context of the Court’s rejection of the argument that stare 
decisis would require retention of the physical presence rule.215
Wayfair revisited the question in Quill whether retention of the 
rule could be justified solely on the basis of stare decisis.216 The 
Court concluded that it could not be, because physical presence 
is not a “clear or easily applicable standard.”217 Also, the Court 
noted that “stare decisis accommodates only ‘legitimate reliance 
interest[s]’” and, contrary to such reliance, some Internet vendors 
had been aggressively using the physical presence rule to avoid 
tax and to obtain a market advantage.218 The Court stated that 
209 See supra notes 67–69 and accompanying text.  
210 See South Dakota v. Wayfair Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2091 (2018) (quoting Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)) (emphasis added).  
211 Quill, 504 U.S. at 314–15, 317. 
212 Id. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (noting “the Quill majority concluded that the 
physical presence rule was necessary to prevent undue burdens on interstate commerce”).  
213 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
214 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 320) (noting the concurring 
opinion in Quill of Justice Scalia, which was joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas). 
215 Id. at 2096–98.  
216 Id.
217 Id. at 2098. The dissent split with the majority on this issue. See id. at 2101–02 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
218 Id. at 2096, 2098 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). 
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“constitutional right[s]” do not logically follow from “practical 
opportunities [to engage in] tax avoidance.”219
Wayfair nonetheless remained sympathetic to the burdens that 
the states’ use tax collection duties could impose upon smaller remote 
vendors selling over the Internet. The Court said that “the daunting 
complexity and business-development obstacles of nationwide sales 
tax collection” will result in burdens that “may pose legitimate 
concerns in some instances, particularly for small businesses that 
make a small volume of sales to customers in many States.”220
Wayfair referred sympathetically to such smaller vendors nine 
times.221 It was in response to these concerns that the Court noted 
the potential prospect of such vendors bringing a claim using the Pike
undue burden standard.222
The Wayfair Court’s references to the undue burden test seem 
intended to encourage the states to be fair in their implementation 
of that decision and to otherwise simplify their use tax collection 
laws, if appropriate. When evaluating this general issue Wayfair
referenced the fact that South Dakota law already “affords small 
merchants a reasonable degree of protection.”223 Specifically, the 
Court referred to: (1) South Dakota’s high statutory nexus 
thresholds, as discussed above; (2) the fact that the South Dakota 
statute was not retroactive; and (3) the fact that South Dakota was 
“one of more than [twenty] States that have adopted the 
Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement. . . . [which] standardizes 
taxes to reduce administrative and compliance costs . . .”224 Hence, 
the Court encouraged—though did not require—other states to 
adopt similar measures. As noted earlier, however, the first two 
legal protections—reasonably high nexus thresholds and prospective 
219 Id. at 2098 (internal citation omitted). The Court cited one case for its statement 
concerning legitimate reliance interests and through that citation, intentionally or not, 
analogized the large Internet vendors who had exploited the physical presence rule to 
wrongdoers. See id. (citing United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824, which concluded that 
narcotics smugglers had no “legitimate reliance interest” with respect to the Court’s prior 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure precedent because these persons had used that 
precedent to structure their unlawful businesses). See also Ross, 456 U.S. at 824 & n.3. 
220 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098.  
221 See id. at 2093, 2098–99.  
222 Id. at 2098–99. Given the Court’s longstanding, general notion that it should refrain 
from restricting state sovereignty under the dormant Commerce Clause other than in 
instances of state discrimination, see supra notes 95 and 146 and accompanying text, it seems 
fair to question the Court’s emphasis on protecting small out-of-state vendors. The Commerce 
Clause was not intended to protect any particular class of vendors, see generally U.S. CONST.
art I. § 8, cl. 3., and the Court’s emphasis on singling out small vendors for protection seems to 
be nothing more than a policy determination that is legislative in its nature.  
223 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2098. 
224 Id. at 2099–100. 
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enforcement—may be otherwise generally necessary as a matter of 
due process.225
2. Problems with the Standard 
The Court’s attempt to prod the states to simplify their sales 
tax systems for smaller vendors seems laudable. Perhaps it was 
even necessary to get the Court to a majority of five votes, as 
concern about the potential tax collection burden to be imposed 
upon smaller vendors was certainly an important issue for the 
Justices at oral argument.226 But the Court’s references to the 
undue burden standard were half-hearted, vague, not clearly 
supported by all five Justices in the majority, and make little 
conceptual or practical sense. 
The Wayfair majority invoked the undue burden standard in 
a peculiar way. The Court stated that “the United States argues 
that tax-collection requirements should be analyzed under the 
balancing framework of Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.”227 The United 
States did in fact argue in favor of applying the undue burden 
test to the states’ use tax collection laws in both its Wayfair
amicus brief and at oral argument.228 But the Court’s lukewarm 
endorsement of this point—attributing it not to its own legal 
conclusions but to the thoughts of one of the amici—suggests 
ambivalence. This is not surprising since the Court has been 
retreating from the Pike undue burden test for several decades, 
even in the regulatory context from which that standard derives.229
More specifically, Wayfair’s reference to the Pike undue 
burden standard is inconsistent with the overruling of Quill. That 
overruling was intended to eliminate preferential treatment of 
remote vendors and to dispense with artificial taxpayer 
225 See supra notes 186–188 and 200–202 and accompanying text; see also John 
A. Swain, State Sales and Use Tax Jurisdiction: An Economic Nexus Standard for the 
Twenty-First Century, 38 GA. L. REV. 343, 345 (2003) (“[A]nyone making taxable sales within 
the taxing jurisdiction should have a collection obligation, subject to a de minimis threshold 
below which the cost of collection exceeds the benefit.”); see also Adam B. Thimmesch, The 
Illusory Promise of Economic Nexus, 13 FLA. TAX REV. 157, 199 (2012) (“[A] state need only 
set its threshold amounts high enough to effectively eliminate any unreasonable risk that 
taxpayers will exceed them without having expended constitutionally significant efforts to 
exploit the market.”). 
226 See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138.  
227 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (emphasis added). 
228 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 138 at 26–27; Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 13, 17–23, South Dakota v. Wayfair, 
Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2084 (2018) (No. 17-494).  
229 See Fatale, supra note 81, at 60–62 (describing the Court’s general concerns with 
Pike balancing dating back to the time of Quill); see also Rothfeld, supra note 85, at 489 
(“[G]iven the (largely justified) criticism of the Pike approach as a standardless and 
subjective means of applying the Commerce Clause, it is more than a little surprising that 
the Court chose to expand Pike balancing in the tax area.” (footnote omitted)).  
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distinctions.230 Instead, by suggesting that an undue burden can 
be claimed by small remote vendors but not small out-of-state 
vendors that have an in-state physical presence, the Court served 
to perpetuate—at least in part—similar distinctions.231 Clearly, 
physically present vendors can be in all other respects identical 
to remote vendors, and therefore face identical compliance 
burdens—and yet they are not the vendors Wayfair sought to 
protect. Therefore, unlike their remote vendor competitors, small 
multistate vendors that have in-state physical presence would 
apparently not be able to maintain an undue burden claim. This 
follows because Wayfair did not alter pre-existing jurisdictional 
principles; it merely sought to eliminate the physical presence 
rule, and to explain the effect of that elimination on vendors that 
were formerly protected.232
The undue burden standard was introduced into the state tax 
area by Quill—specifically to prop up the Court’s newly-posited 
physical presence rule.233 The application of the undue burden 
standard in the state tax area was unclear, but on the other hand, 
as posited in Quill, did not need to be put to the test, because the 
standard was merely one predicate that the Court used to adopt 
its “bright-line” physical presence rule.234 It was physical 
presence—and the three other prongs of the pre-existing Complete 
Auto test—that were to address “undue burdens.”235 This meant 
that the mechanics of specifically evaluating undue burden in the 
state tax area was, if anything, just a conceptual idea lurking in 
the background.  
Justice Kennedy, who wrote the Wayfair decision, did not 
join the section in Quill that referenced undue burden making 
his seeming, even if lukewarm, endorsement of that standard in 
Wayfair more mystifying. When Wayfair cites criticism of the 
physical presence rule—something it says has “been the target of 
criticism over many years from many quarters”—it cites only a 
230 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2092–94. 
231 Cf. Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 364 (1941) (noting that once the 
state has extended to a mail-order vendor the privilege to do business in the state, the 
state may exact “this burden [of tax collection] as a price of enjoying the full benefits 
flowing from its [in-state] business”). See also Rothfeld, supra note 85, at 490 (questioning 
Quill’s concern with the burdens imposed upon remote vendors when the burden for 
comparable vendors with physical presence is identical). 
232 See supra notes 158–166 and 177 and accompanying text. 
233 See Rothfeld, supra note 85, at 488 (noting that prior to Quill the Court had not 
applied Pike balancing in a tax case); see also supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text. 
234 See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text. 
235 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312–15 (1992); see also Fatale, supra
note 22, at 592–93.  
48 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 22:1
single article.236 And that article, immediately after the page 
cited, criticizes the invocation of undue burden analysis in the 
context of the use tax collection duty, stating that it “cannot be 
reconciled with prior decisions of the Court.”237 That same article 
also states that the undue burden analysis, as so invoked, 
“suffer[s] from serious logical flaws.”238
In general, state tax cases since the time of Quill do not rely 
on or even evaluate the application of the undue burden test. 
This is because, as noted, Quill made clear that in the state tax 
context the undue burden analysis is not a stand-alone test, but 
rather merely a concern that is addressed by the four prongs of 
Complete Auto, including the nexus requirement.239 The Court 
has stated, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles240 that, 
when those four prongs are met, “no impermissible burden on 
interstate commerce will be found . . . .”241 When Wayfair stated 
its rule pertaining to state tax nexus, it cited to language in 
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez,242 and those cited pages in 
turn referenced the analysis in Japan Line that included this 
statement.243 Also, since the time of Quill no case has found that 
a state tax imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce, 
apart from consideration of the Complete Auto standards.244
Further, the two concurring Justices in Wayfair, Justices 
Thomas and Gorsuch, both limited their approval of the majority’s 
decision to the holding—the eradication of the physical presence 
rule.245 Both Justices criticized the Court’s dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence more generally246—and Pike balancing is one 
prominent component of that jurisprudence.247 Justice Thomas 
previously joined Justice Scalia’s dissent in a state case decided 
three years before Wayfair that critiqued the dormant Commerce 
Clause as “a judge-invented rule under which judges may set aside 
state laws that they think impose too much of a burden upon 
236 Wayfair, 138 S.Ct. at 2092 (quoting Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 1129, 
1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Rothfeld, supra note 85)). 
237 Rothfeld, supra note 85, at 489. 
238 Id. 
239 See supra note 235 and accompanying text. 
240 441 U.S. 434 (1979). 
241 Id. at 444–45. 
242 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (citing Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 
1, 11 (2009)). 
243 Polar Tankers, Inc., 557 U.S. at 11 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los 
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 441–45 (1979)). 
244 Fatale, supra note 22, at 593–94, 594 n.157. 
245 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, 
J., concurring).  
246 Id. at 2100 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2100–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).  
247 See Fatale, supra note 81, at 60–62. 
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interstate commerce.”248 Justice Gorsuch in his Wayfair
concurrence favorably cited that same Scalia dissent.249
3. Practical Application  
Given the above analysis, it seems unlikely that the Court itself 
would actually apply the undue burden standard to a use tax 
collection duty. So, why then mention it? As noted, the Court 
seemed to be encouraging the states to be fair in their 
administration of Wayfair. Suggesting that there is some legal 
standard that could sit in judgment of the states’ actions—however 
unlikely or unclear that standard may be—arguably tends to 
serve that purpose, if only because state personnel, like most 
persons, tend to fear the unknown. Also, the Court is not likely to 
be the adjudicator of later undue burden claims, should they 
manifest. That test would relate to the determination of state tax 
nexus, and before Wayfair the Court had not taken a nexus case 
in twenty-five years—despite repeated certiorari petitions in 
state tax cases.250 The Court’s calculus seemed to be to relegate 
questions concerning undue burden to the state courts, and then 
assume that those courts will police these burdens—presumably 
understanding the problem, and knowing the solution, in the 
context of specific cases.251
What an undue burden litigation claim might look like and 
who would bring one (including in what state) is an open 
question. Pike itself suggests the dilemma, as in that case the 
Court struck down an order issued pursuant to a statute enacted 
by the state of Arizona that would require persons that grew 
cantaloupes in the state to pack the cantaloupes in-state and to 
identify that the cantaloupes were from an Arizona packer.252
The difficulty for the grower was that it did not pack its 
cantaloupes in Arizona, but rather shipped them to its packing 
facility in California, where they were not labeled as packed in 
248 See Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1807–08 (2015) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
249 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2101 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 
at 1807 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
250 See Fatale, supra note 22, at 583–84 n.106. 
251 See Darien Shanske, Wayfair as Federalism Decision, MEDIUM (June 4, 2018), 
https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/wayfair-as-federalism-decision-16577e592a6b 
[http://perma.cc/2TNF-8T24] (“The Court in Wayfair does not explicitly shift to a kind of 
balancing test (in particular, Pike balancing), but its retention of a ‘substantial nexus’ standard 
without much further guidance seems to invite the states to engage in balancing.”); 
Maria Koklanaris, 4 Constitutional Questions To Ponder In A Post-Quill World, LAW360
(June 29, 2018, 8:11 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1058921/4-constitutional-questions-
to-ponder-in-a-post-quill-world (citing tax practitioner opinions for the view that Wayfair
embodies “a nudge to states not to impose undue burdens lest they be checked”). 
252 Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 138–40, 146 (1970). 
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Arizona.253 The Court concluded that the Arizona statute was too 
burdensome as applied to the grower, where the grower would 
have had to expend an extra $200,000 to pack a $700,000 crop.254
In the context of the use tax collection duty, Pike would seem 
to suggest that one is to compare the taxpayer’s costs of 
compliance with the revenue benefits to the state from the 
collected tax.255 But that is an apples and oranges comparison 
that would seem to turn on entirely subjective considerations as 
to what value one attributes to the tax.256 The subjectivity that is 
inherent in the Pike balancing test as applied in the regulatory 
context is the very essence of why the Court has retreated from 
the test in recent years.257 Also, if one is to apply the test to the 
use tax collection duty, it is hard to see how, in light of Wayfair, a 
state that adopts South Dakota-like thresholds could fail. In 
Pike, the Court recognized the state’s interest in its cantaloupe 
statute as being “legitimate,” but not “compelling.”258 In contrast, 
Wayfair emphasized the critical importance of the states’ tax 
collection function.259
Pike also suggests that a state law could fail its test if there 
is a less onerous state way to achieve the same result.260 But the 
253 Id. at 139. 
254 Id. at 140, 145–46. 
255 Justice Breyer—who did not join the Wayfair majority opinion—suggested as much 
at the oral argument, commenting that the inquiry would seemingly be to determine 
whether “the benefits of state revenue do not outweigh the compliance costs associated with 
the tax collection obligations that the state has imposed.” See Transcript of Oral Argument, 
supra note 138, at 57. Justice Breyer recognized such an inquiry could unleash significant 
litigation. See id.
256 Cf. Dep’t of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 355 (2008) (“What is most 
significant about these [Pike] cost-benefit questions is not even the difficulty of answering 
them or the inevitable uncertainty of the predictions that might be made in trying to come 
up with answers, but the unsuitability of the judicial process and judicial forums for 
making whatever predictions and reaching whatever answers are possible at all.”); id. at 
355–56 (“Courts as institutions are poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the relative 
burdens of various methods of taxation. The complexities of factual economic proof always 
present a certain potential for error, and courts have little familiarity with the process of 
evaluating the relative economic burden of taxes.”) (quoting Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 
U.S. 325, 342 (1996)). 
257 See Fatale, supra note 81, at 60–62. It is for similar reasons that the Court backed 
away from its early twentieth century dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that considered 
whether a taxpayer’s in-state activity was interstate or intrastate. See supra notes 23–25 
and accompanying text. 
258 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 143–46 (stating that the “regulatory scheme could perhaps 
be tolerated if a more compelling state interest were involved” but that “the State’s 
interest is minimal at best—certainly less substantial than a State’s interest in securing 
employment for its people”). 
259 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2088, 2095 (2018); see also 
Fatale, supra note 81, at 42 n.3 (citing cases).  
260 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 (“If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question 
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course 
depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted 
as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.”).  
2019] Wayfair, What’s Fair, and Undue Burden 51 
difficulty with this logic, as transposed to the state tax context, is 
that it will probably always be the case that a tax system could 
be made simpler with modest reductions in revenue. Yet, this 
alone would seem to be insufficient grounds for striking down an 
entire “tax system.”261 That result certainly seems inconsistent 
with Wayfair’s pro-state sovereignty analysis.262
Wayfair implied that the only vendors that could logically 
bring an undue burden claim would be small remote vendors, as 
they would have the greatest difficulty with the tax implications 
resulting from the case.263 It is not inconceivable, for example, 
that—at least hypothetically—a smaller vendor would have to 
incur what for it could be significant costs to pay a tax to a 
specific state that would be, in dollar terms, less significant. But 
if the state’s nexus thresholds were to at least mirror that of 
South Dakota, it is hard to see how—at least applying Wayfair’s 
analysis—so small a vendor could ever become subject to the 
state’s law.264 Larger vendors—the vendors that Wayfair
accused of using Quill to unfairly avoid tax collection265—would 
more likely be the persons seeking to enjoin a state’s law. But 
Wayfair suggested that because larger vendors have greater 
means to comply, they would be less likely to have an undue 
burden claim.266
261 See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099. 
262 See supra notes 133–137 and accompanying text. Wayfair referenced only one 
other burdens-type case, S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), which preceded Pike.
See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091. Southern Pacific makes even less sense as applied in the 
state tax context. See supra notes 71–81 and accompanying text.  
263 The majority made nine references to small businesses. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 
2093, 2098–99. The dissent expressed sympathy for small businesses as well. See id. at 
2104. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). In contrast, the majority viewed larger vendors as bad 
actors that had attempted to manipulate the Quill physical presence rule. See id. at 2098 
(“Some remote retailers go so far as to advertise sales as tax free. A business ‘is in no 
position to found a constitutional right on the practical opportunities for tax avoidance.’” 
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 366 
(1941))). See also supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. The Court’s citation for this 
proposition was to the brief of the petitioner, South Dakota, which quoted the respondent 
Wayfair’s website. See id. (citing Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 138, at 55). See also id. at 
2099 (“[R]espondents are large, national companies that undoubtedly maintain an extensive 
virtual presence.”); see also id. (acknowledging that there could be legal questions about 
state implementation of its decision but concluding that prospect “cannot justify retaining 
[an] anachronistic rule that deprives States of vast revenues from major businesses”).  
264 See id. at 2098 (noting that “the law at issue requires a merchant to collect the tax 
only if it does a considerable amount of business in the State” and that the law “applies a 
safe harbor to those who transact only limited business in [the state]”).  
265 See id. at 2093, 2098–99, 2104. See also supra note 263 and accompanying text. 
266 See id. at 2098–99. See Walter Hellerstein and Andrew Appleby, Substantive and 
Enforcement Jurisdiction in a Post-Wayfair World, Tax Analysts, STATE TAX TODAY (Oct. 
22, 2018) (“It may be difficult for large, sophisticated remote sellers to avoid a sales and 
use tax collection obligation under the Pike balancing test. The Court has recognized that 
imposing such obligations on sellers is a ‘familiar and sanctioned device,’ and that the 
‘sole burden imposed upon the out-of-state seller . . . is the administrative one of collecting 
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The nature of sales tax is such that a larger vendor with the 
means to comply with a state’s law would almost certainly have 
to comply with that law or could be ultimately responsible for 
paying the tax that it failed to collect from consumers out of its 
own pocket. On the other hand, a vendor in full compliance with 
a state’s use tax collection law would seemingly face a difficult 
hurdle in attempting to claim that this collection activity was 
nonetheless unduly burdensome. That same general issue would 
apparently lurk also if the vendor was collecting use tax in most 
states but not the state in question. In that case, the vendor 
would have to justify its disparate approach in the latter state.  
In any lawsuit claiming that a state tax is unconstitutional, 
there is a question as to whether the claim is that the statute is 
“facially” unconstitutional, i.e., is not valid on any conceivable set 
of facts, or unconstitutional “as applied” to the taxpayer.267
Wayfair vaguely suggested that an undue burden challenge could 
result in the invalidity of a state statute268—a potential result 
that could apparently occur only in the context of a facial 
challenge. But conversely the essence of an undue burden challenge 
would necessarily seem to be a “case-by-case evaluation.”269
Certainly, the repeated statements in Wayfair to the effect that 
only smaller vendors could logically maintain an undue burden 
claim indicates that a successful facial challenge would be 
unlikely; a small vendor could have a reasonable as applied 
claim, but the state law would presumably remain valid as to 
larger vendors.  
One other issue that arises when considering a potential undue 
burden claim pertains to the desired outcome. In the past, vendor 
litigation concerning the physical presence standard was intended 
to broaden the states’ interpretation of that standard because, once 
broadened, all taxpayers—including the litigant—would benefit 
from that expanded interpretation on a going forward basis. But a 
determination that a state tax system is too burdensome in a 
particular respect—e.g., because the nexus thresholds are too 
low—would presumably provide a road map to the state as to how 
[the tax].’”) (quoting Gen. Trading Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 322 U.S. 335, 338 (1944) and 
Nat’l Geographic Soc’y v. Cal. Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 558 (1977)). 
267 See Overstock.com, Inc. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Taxation & Fin., 987 N.E.2d 621, 
624 (N.Y. 2013). 
268 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2099 (“The question remains whether some other principle 
in the Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine might invalidate the Act.”). 
269 See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 313, 314–15 (1992). Pike itself resulted in 
only a specific case determination as to the litigant. See Pike v. Bruce Church, 397 U.S. 137, 
140, 145–46 (1970); see also Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2094 (“The Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has ‘eschewed formalism for a sensitive, case-by-case analysis of purposes and 
effects.’” (citing West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 201 (1994))). 
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to fix the problem. The upshot is that most non-claimant 
taxpayers subject to the law would likely be unaffected by such a 
ruling because it would likely be an as applied determination. 
And, because the state would probably act to amend its law in 
response to the decision, even a victorious taxpayer could end up 
collecting the tax in short order anyway. 
The above analysis suggests that there may not be much 
undue burden litigation in the aftermath of Wayfair. But that 
could be wishful thinking. For example, Quill clearly suggested 
that the physical presence rule was limited to the states’ use tax 
collection duty, but that did not prevent twenty-five years’ worth 
of litigation addressing whether the standard had broader 
application.270 It would of course be ironic if Wayfair unleashed a 
quarter-century of cases on a question that seems specious 
because Quill did the same thing, and one of Wayfair’s purposes 
was to reject the calamitous after-effects of Quill.
V. CONCLUSION
Wayfair eradicated the nonsensical physical presence nexus 
requirement that the Court had created in Bellas Hess and Quill.
The Court thereby effectively completed, more than one-half 
century later, a trend in its dormant Commerce Clause cases that 
commenced in the mid-part of the Twentieth Century—reversing 
the conclusion that free trade considerations impose limitations on 
the state tax jurisdiction rules that apply to multi-state companies 
engaged in business in a state.  
Though it dispensed with the idea that certain large 
companies doing business across state lines are sometimes 
entitled to state tax immunity, Wayfair expressed concern with 
the compliance costs of the use tax collection duty as applied to 
smaller multi-state businesses. To address these concerns, the 
Court repeated the error of Bellas Hess and Quill and posited a 
vague new legal test, pertaining to “undue burden,” that has no 
basis in the Court’s prior state tax cases. Ironically, the notion of 
transposing the undue burden concept to the state tax context 
traces entirely to the analysis in Quill that Wayfair otherwise 
rejected. Further, because the undue burden test has never been 
actually applied to state tax cases, it is not apparent how it 
could apply. Hence the concept has the prospect of unleashing 
the same type of confusion and litigation that followed in the 
aftermath of Quill.
270 See Fatale, supra note 22, at 583–84 n.106; see also generally Capital One Auto 
Fin., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 22 Or. Tax 326 (2016), affirmed, 363 Or. 441 (2018). 
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Wayfair noted correctly that “[t]he physical presence rule is a 
poor proxy for the compliance costs faced by companies that do 
business in multiple States.”271 It also stated that “[o]ther aspects 
of the Court’s doctrine can better and more accurately address 
any potential burdens on interstate commerce, whether or not 
Quill’s physical presence rule is satisfied.”272 But the Court did 
not need to posit a new, poorly-considered state tax test to help to 
accomplish these goals. The elimination of the physical presence 
rule means that the primary nexus standard to be applied when 
evaluating state tax jurisdiction is due process, which adequately 
addresses the state tax burdens to be faced by smaller—as well 
as all other—multistate businesses. Due process requires that a 
state tax be adequately noticed, otherwise fair, and applied to 
remote vendors engaged in significant in-state market exploitation. 
When these standards are met, there is no issue as to undue 
burden. The Court’s robust anti-discrimination principle addresses 
all other constitutional concerns.273
Wayfair stated that “[i]f it becomes apparent that the Court’s 
Commerce Clause decisions prohibit the States from exercising 
their lawful sovereign powers in our federal system, the Court 
should be vigilant in correcting the error.”274 It seems patent that 
the Court did not issue Wayfair with the intent to actively evaluate 
future state tax nexus claims.275 Also, due process considerations 
are sufficient to evaluate such claims. Nonetheless, the Court 
should remain vigilant to one day revisit Wayfair and thereby 
correct its erroneous undue burden test. 
   
271 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2093. 
272 Id.
273 See supra notes 95 and 146 and accompanying text. 
274 Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2096. 
275 See supra notes 250–251 and accompanying text. 
